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COMMENT: LEVERAGED BUYOUT
FUNDS AS A POINT OF COMPARISON
John G. Nestort
I am John Nestor, a managing partner with Kirtland Capital
Partners and the only non-lawyer speaking today. This morning I
have been asked to make comments on the talk that John McIlwraith
has just given. John and I worked together in 1986 when I joined
Kirtland Capital and John was at Jones Day. In fact, he helped me
with the first deal I did at Kirtland, and no doubt, I contributed to
some of his gray hairs.
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To begin with, I would like to talk about private equity and
where it comes from. Private equity includes both money for venture
funds and for leveraged buyout ("LBO") groups. Approximately
43% of private equity is derived from corporate and public pension
funds. The balance is split up almost equally among endowments and
foundations, bank holding companies, wealthy families and individu-
als, insurance and investment banks and another 13% from various
sources.
Figure 2 shows the amount of committed capital that went into
venture and buyout investments from the period 1980 to 1991. While
starting at very low amounts in the early 1980s, it gradually increased
and reached record levels in 1999, which most likely will be exceeded
in 2000. These investments and the activity in venture and buyout
funds has been fueled by the large amount of money made available
through them, particularly from pension funds which have had to find
ways to invest the increasing amount of money they are managing.
Figure 2
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As you can see in 1999, the amount of committed capital going
into venture funds exceeded that for buyout funds for the first time.
The reason is very simple. The return on venture funds exceeded that
of the buyout funds beginning in 1994. Figure 3 illustrates this. All
of this was a direct result of the funds being invested in the venture
firms that were backing all of the high-tech companies that we have
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all read about. With some of the recent setbacks in the stock market,
the return on some of these venture funds may, in fact, also come
down.
Figure 3
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What I was asked to do this morning was to comment on John
Mcllwraith's talk, which I have now done. I am going to follow the
lead of Al Gore and George Bush during the televised debates in
which they would initially and very quickly answer the question that
they were asked, and then go off and talk about what they would like.
So with that in mind, I fulfilled my obligation and now I would like to
spend the rest of my time talking about LBO funds and contrast those
investments with the venture funds that John talked about. Someone
once told me that to give a successful presentation, you do not have to
be witty and stimulating and provide the audience with a lot of facts,
but rather you have to give the audience good news. I do have good
news, but you are going to have to wait until the end of my talk to
hear it. So for the next ten minutes I will try to be witty and stimu-
lating, keep your attention, provide a lot of facts and figures, and tell
you where I think the LBO industry has been and where it will go in
the future.
LBOs have developed over time and have undergone various
phases. Phase I began in the 1970s. In the mid- to late 1970s a num-
ber of people, including my partner Jack Turben, who started Kirtland
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Capital in 1977, realized that if you found a company that had a lot of
assets, you could purchase the company by going to a bank which
would lend against the assets. To complete the deal, you could put in
a little equity. Because of the small equity base, you could get very
good returns just by paying down debt. There were a few companies
who did this very well, including one organized by three gentlemen
by the name of Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts, who did it in increas-
ingly larger deals. Typically, the target companies were mostly pri-
vately held and there was little competition because there were very
few firms doing this.
Phase II encompassed most of the 1980s, with LBOs gaining in-
creasing popularity and developing into almost a frenzy by the late
1980s. The biggest difference during this period was a result of Mi-
chael Milken's development of junk bonds or high-yield bonds as a
way to finance LBOs. This stimulated the whole industry and made it
much easier to acquire larger and larger companies with public com-
panies becoming the target of LBO firms.
During the 1970s and 1980s, many conglomerates had been put
together, but some did not yield the synergies or earnings that had
been intended. As a result, a corporate raider or an LBO firm could
go in, take the company private, cut people and costs, sell assets and
pay down debt, and generate very significant returns. In many cases
the parts were worth more than the whole company.
During this period, the LBO industry became more structured
with funds being raised for the express purpose of doing LBOs. The
number of firms involved was still relatively small, as shown in Fig-
ure 4, and the dollars raised were modest compared to today's funds.
Figure 4
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This was a result of the fact that transactions were still very highly
leveraged. Figure 5 shows that in 1987 you could put in as little as
7% in equity and finance the rest. By 1989, this had almost doubled
to 13%, but still represented very little equity required to complete a
transaction.
Figure 5
Equity as a Percentage of LBO Financings
03 Contributed Equity
Sources: Portfolio Management Data LLC, Buyouts Straight Talk.
Figure 6 illustrates the amount of leverage in these transactions.
Bank debt to EBITDA averaged almost five times in 1987. It was
still almost 3.5 times in 1989. In addition, transactions were also
funded with non-bank debt, which took total leverage on average in
1987 to 8.8 times and 6.7 times in 1989. These are very high multi-
ples and contrast very significantly from what is happening in today's
market, which you will see later.
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Figure 6
Average Debt Multiples of Highly Leveraged Loans
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The next phase was in the 1990s, which can be divided into two
phases. In the early 1990s, buyouts slowed because of the problems
in the high-yield and bank markets and the slow down in the econ-
omy. Because the transactions done in the late 1980s were so highly
leveraged, when the economy slowed down there were many defaults
in both bank loans and junk bonds, resulting in a period when very
few transactions were completed.
The mid- and late 1990s reflected a turnaround in LBO activity
fueled by a better economy and a large amount of capital available to
buyout funds and a proliferation of new buyout groups. Figure 7
shows the history of total equity raised and, as you can see, it reached
a peak in 1998 totaling almost $55 billion. While the final numbers
in 2000 are not yet in, it is likely to be close to the record set in 1998.
The number of funds closed also reached new highs in the late 1990s.
It is now estimated that there are over 800 LBO firms, which resulted
in too many dollars chasing too few deals. This has caused the re-
turns of LBO groups to go down, which was illustrated in one of the
earlier charts.
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Figure 7
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Because of the competition and the amount of money available,
the focus of LBOs has changed. There have been more international
deals done; some funds have been specifically raised to do interna-
tional transactions. Many LBO firms have tried to do roll-ups in an
industry where they invest in one company and try to make acquisi-
tions of similar type companies. We have seen roll-ups in everything
from candy stores to funeral parlors.
One change has been the requirement by the banks to put in
larger equity contributions, which has also held down returns. Figure
8 shows the increasing amount of equity required as compared to
1987.
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Figure 8
Strong Equity Component: Equity as a Percentage of LBO
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The other competitive factor for LBOs has been the IPO market.
An increasing number of companies have turned to the IPO market
for liquidity as opposed to being bought out by LBO funds.
That now brings us up to the present and what we are seeing in
2000, which appears to be yet another phase. The most significant
development has been in the lending market, both the banks and high
yield. The banks increasingly have had portfolio problems and the
amount of non-performing assets, as shown in Figure 9, has increased
dramatically. At the same time, the number of corporate debt de-
faults, shown in Figure 10, has also increased dramatically. As a re-
sult, it is much harder to complete a transaction because of the tighter
credit markets than in the past. This problem has been exacerbated by
the decreasing number of banks due to consolidation. Figure 11 il-
lustrates this.
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Figure 9
Nonperforming Assets at the Top Twenty Banks
Source: Public Filings.
Figure 10
Defaults on Public Debt
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Figure 11
Impact of Bank Consolidation
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Over the last eight years, twenty-six very large banks, most of
which had been active in financing LBOs, have been bought or
merged into six. Many of those on the list are currently having credit
problems, which has made the market even tighter.
Because of the tight credit markets, LBO firms have been forced
to put in increasingly high levels of equity to get a bank to finance
any of their transactions. This is illustrated in Figure 12.
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Figure 12
Strong Equity Component: Equity as a Percentage of LBO
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Earlier, I talked about how much leverage banks were willing to
allow in transactions in the late 1980s and, as you can see from Figure
13, they have become increasingly conservative over the last couple
of years, and particularly during 2000. I think we can expect this to
continue through 2001. Another interesting development has been
the slowdown in the number of IPOs. There have been some dra-
matic peaks and valleys in that market, and it is likely we will see that
again as the stock market comes down to earth. This should result,
over a period of time, in an increase in the use of LBOs, as the IPO
market is likely to diminish.
The question now is, what happens to LBOs in the future? As
many of you know, law firms have been very instrumental in the
growth of the IPO market and have in turn grown significantly be-
cause of the amount of legal expense it takes to complete a transac-
tion. I think that because of the changing nature of the industry, there
will be an increasing need for legal help. More and more firms are
completing international transactions, which require assistance in un-
derstanding the legal requirements in other countries. Many firms are
considering minority ownership in the companies they are buying or
are looking to buy businesses with other LBO groups. This requires
more complicated shareholder agreements.
A more challenging financing environment requires more crea-
tivity in terms of financing. Because of the declining stock market,
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there are more likely to be public companies going private, which
requires additional legal expertise. The fading IPO market will result
in more activity for LBOs, but it is likely that there will continue to be
pressure on lower returns. With less room for error, this means that
there will be more emphasis on due diligence.
Figure 13
Average Debt Multiples of Highly Leveraged Loans
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The conclusion from all of this is that there will still be a very
vibrant LBO market, although changed from what we saw in the
1980s and 1990s. It will continue to be very competitive. Returns are
not likely to be at the levels that they were in the 1980s, but they will
still be attractive.
And what does this all mean for the legal community? It means
that LBO firms will need more legal help with due diligence, an un-
derstanding of international laws, more time spent with the financing
side of transactions, the intricacies of public companies going private,
more shareholder issues and the need for speed and help with struc-
turing and tax planning. In turn this leads to more billable hours,
which is the good news that I promised.
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